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Abstract 
We consider several disrributed collaborarive key agree- 
rnenr protocols for dyna~nic peer gro~rps. This problem has 
sevelal irnporranr characteristics which make it dlfferenr 
fron? rradiriotlal seclrre group co~n~n~rr~icatior~. They are 
( I )  disrrib~rred nature in which there is no centralized key 
server, ( 2 )  collaborative nature ill which the group key is 
contributive; i.e., each group member M ~ I  collaboratively 
contribute its part to the global group key, and ( 3 )  dynamic 
nature in which existing members can leave the group while 
new members ma? join. Instead of performing b~dividual 
rekey operations, i.e., reco/npurit1g the group key after ev- 
e o  join or leave request, we consider an interval based 
approach of rekeying. 111 pat-ricula~; we consider three dis- 
tributed nlgoritlz~?ls for updating the group k e ~ ~ :  ( I )  the Re- 
build algorithm, ( 2 )  the Batch algorithm, and ( 3 )  the Queue- 
batch algorithm. We analyze the perfortnatice of these dis- 
tributed algorirl~~ns under dlfferetzt settings, including dif- 
ferent populario~z sizes and different jobdleave probabili- 
ties. We show that these three disrributed algorithms signif- 
icantly outperfor~n the individual rekej~ algorithm, and that 
the Queue-batch algorirhtn perfor~ns the best among the 
three distributed algorithms. Moreover; the Queue-batch 
algorirhtn has the irztrinsic property of balar~cing the con- 
putatio~l/ro~nmunicatio~l workload such that the dyna~nic 
peer group can quickly begin secure group com~nunicarion. 
Tl~is  provides fur1datnenral understa~zding about establish- 
ing a collaborative group key for a distributed dyna~nicpeer 
group. 
1. Introduction 
With the emergence of many group-oriented distributed 
applications such as multi-player games and telelvideo- 
conferencing. there is a need for security services to provide 
'J.  Lui was supported in pan by the Mainline and RGC Research Grant: 
D. Yau was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under 
grant numbers CCR-9875742 (CAREER) and EIA-9806741. 
group-oriented comn2unication privacy and data integrity. 
To provide this form of group communication privacy, it is 
important that members of the group can establish a com- 
mon secret key for encrypting group communication data. 
For example, consider a group of people in a peer-to-peer 
ad hoc network having a closed and confidential business 
meeting. Since they have not previously agreed upon a 
common secret key, communication between group mem- 
bers is susceptible to eavesdropping. To solve the problem, 
we need a secure distributed group key agreement proto- 
col such that the group of people can establish the com- 
mon group key for secure and private communication. Note 
that this type of key agreement protocols is both distribu- 
tive and contributory in nature: each member of the group 
contributes its part to the overall group key. 
It is important to point out that the type of distributed 
group key agreement protocols we study is very differ- 
ent from more traditional centralized group key agreement 
protocols. Centralized protocols rely on a centralized key 
server to efficiently distribute the group key. An excellent 
body of work on centralized key distribution protocols ex- 
ists [6, 7, 10, l I]. In those approaches, group members are 
arranged in a logical key hierarchy known as a key tree. Us- 
ing the tree topology, it is easy to distribute the group key to 
members whenever there is any change in the group mem- 
bership (e.g., a new member joins or an existing member 
leaves). For distributed key agreement protocols, however, 
there is no centralized key server available. This arrange- 
ment is justified in many situations - e.g., in a peer-to-peer 
or ad hoc network where centralized resources are not read- 
ily available. Moreover, an advantage of distributed proto- 
cols over the centralized protocols is increased system reli- 
ability, because the group key is generated in a shared and 
contributory fashion and there is no single point of failure. 
In the special case of a communication group having 
only two members, these members can create a group key 
using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [2]. In the 
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p and a generator a .  They can generate their secret compo- 
nents e x  and e,,: respectively. Member X (resp., Y )  can 
compute its public key ae* (resp., a e y )  and send it to Y 
(resp., X). Since both members know their own exponent, 
they can each raise the other party's public key to the ex- 
ponent and produce a common group key aexey . Using 
the common group key, X and Y can encrypt their data to 
prevent eavesdropping by intruders. 
In this paper, we consider a dynamic commtlnication 
group in which members are located in a distributed fash- 
ion. We extend the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to 
more than two members in the communication gmup. The 
membership of the communication group is dynamic so that 
inembers can leave and new members can join the group at 
any time. The contributions of our work are: 
The key agreement protocol is distributed in nature and 
does not require a centralized key server. 
The key agreement protocol is contributive - each 
member contributes its part to the overall group key. 
We illustrate that instead of performing individual 
rekeying operations, one can use an interval-based ap- 
proach to significantly reduce the computation and 
communication costs of maintaining the group key. 
We propose three distributed interval-based rekey pro- 
tocols. and carry out qualitative and simulation-based 
analyses to illustrate their performance merits. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec- 
tion 2, we provide the background of the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol. We explain how it can be extended to a Tree- 
Based Group Diffie-Hellman protocol so that it can accom- 
modate more than two members in a dynamic peer group. In 
Section 3, we present three interval-based distributed algo- 
rithms to reduce the computation and communication costs 
for maintaining the group key in a dynamic peer group. 
We also carry out mathematical analyses to quantify sys- 
tem performance according to given performance metrics 
when the original Diffie-Hellman tree is a completely bal- 
anced tree. In Section 4, we report several experiments that 
illustrate the system cost under dynamic joins and leaves, 
for various system parameters (e.g., group size, jointleave 
probabilities). We discuss related work in Section 5. Sec- 
tion 6 concludes. 
2. Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman Protocol 
To efficiently maintain the group key in a dynamic peer 
group with more than two members, we use the Tree-Based 
Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol proposed in [3]. 
Each member maintains a set of keys. The keys are arranged 
in a hierarchical bit~ary tree structure. We assign a node 
ID v to every tree node. For a given node v, we associate 
a secret (or private) key K, and a blinded (or public) key 
BK, .  Based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol [2], where all 
arithmetics are performed in a group of prime order p with 
generator a: the blinded key of node v can be generated by 
BK, = aK"modp. (1) 
Each leaf node in the tree represents the individual secret 
key of a member and is uniquely defined by a group member 
A,&. Every member holds all the secret keys along the key 
path starting from its associated leaf node up to the root 
node. Therefore, the secret key held by the root node is 
shared by all the members and is regarded as the group key. 
Figure 1 illustrates a possible key tree with six members MI 
to MG.  For example, member M I  holds the keys in nodes 
7, 3, 1 and 0. The secret key at node 0 is the group key of 
the peer group. 
Figure 1. Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman 
The node ID of the root node is set to 0. Each non-leaf 
node v' consists of two child nodes, whose node IDS are 
2v' + 1 and 2v' + 2. Based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol, 
the secret key of a non-leaf node v' can be generated by the 
secret key of one child node of v', and the blinded key of 
another child node of v'. Mathematically, we have 
K, = ( ~ 1 < ~ , 1 + ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ' + 2 m o d p  
= ( B K ~ , , + ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ' + ~  mod y 
- CyK2u1+1 K ~ u f + 2  mod p. (2) 
Unlike keys at the non-leaf nodes, the secret key at a leaf 
node is selected by its associated member in the commu- 
nication group. The key selection can be achieved through 
a secure pseudo random number generator [8]. Since the 
blinded keys are publicly known, every member can com- 
pute the keys along its key path to the root node based on 
its individual secret key. To illustrate, consider the group 
membership in Figure 1 .  Every member Mi will generate 
its own secret key and all the secret keys along the path to 
the root node. For example, member M1 generates the se- 
cret key K7 and it can request the blinded key BK8 from 
M2,  B K 4  from M3, and BIC2 from either M 4 ,  A15 or MG. 
Given Ml ' s  secret key K7 and the blinded key B K 8 ,  M I  
can generate the secret key K3 according to Equation (2). 
Given the blinded key BIG and the newly generated secret 
key K3,  M l  can generate the secret key K1 based on Equa- 
tion (2). Given the secret key K1 and the blinded key BK2 ,  
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M1 can generate the secret key KO at the root. From that 
point on. any comn~unication between any members in the 
group can be encrypted based on the group key (or secret 
key) KO. 
To ensure backward and forward confidentiality, rekey- 
big is performed whenever there is any change in the group 
membership. This includes any new member joining or any 
existing member leaving the group. Let us first consider 
individual rekeying, meaning that rekeying is carried out 
for each single join or leave event. Before the group mem- 
bership is changed, a special member called the sponsor 
is elected: and the sponsor is responsible for updating the 
keys held by the new members (in the join case) or departed 
members (in the leave case). We use the convention that the 
rightmost member under the subtree rooted at the sibling of 
the joinlleave nodes takes the sponsor role. Note that the 
existence of sponsors does not violate the requirement of 
the decentralized management as the group key generation 
still requires the contribution of all members in the group. 
Figure 2. Rekeying for single leave 
Figure 2 illustrates the event of a member leave event. 
Suppose that the member M5 leaves the system, node 11 
will be promoted to node 5, and member Mq will be the 
sponsor. A44 needs to rekey the secret keys K2 and KO, 
and broadcasts the blinded keys BK2 and BK5 to all the 
members. Upon receiving the blinded key BK2, M I ,  M2 
and M3 can compute the group key KO. Members M6 and 
M y ,  upon receiving BK5, can compute K2 and then the 
group key KO. 
Figure 3. Rekeying at a single join 
Figure 3 illustrates a new member M8 that wishes to join 
the group. has to first determine the insertion node un- 
der which M8 can be inserted. To add a node, say v' (or 
tree, say T') to the insertion node, a new node, say n', is 
first created. Then the subtree rooted at the insertion node 
becomes the left child of the node n', and the node v' (or 
the root node of the tree Ti)  becomes the right child of the 
node n'. The node n' will replace the original location of 
the insertion node. The insertion node is either the right- 
most shallowest position such that the join does not increase 
the tree height, or the root node if the tree is initially well 
balanced (in this case, the height of the resulting tree will 
increase by I). Figure 3 illustrates this concept. The inser- 
tion node is node 5 and the sponsor is Ad4. M8 then broad- 
casts its blinded key BK12 upon insertion. Given BKI2 ,  
M4 rekeys K5, K2 and KO in its local memory, and then 
broadcasts the blinded keys BK5 and BK2 to all members 
in the group. After receiving the blinded keys from AJ4, all 
remaining members can rekey all the keys along their key 
paths and obtain the new group key. 
Based on the above leaveljoin events in Figures 2 and 
3 ,  it is clear that we can reduce one rekeying operation if 
we could simply change the association of node 12 from 
M5 to I%&. Interval-based rekeying is thus proposed such 
that rekeying is performed on a batch of join and leave re- 
quests. Members carry out rekeying operations at regular 
rekey inten~als. The motivation is to improve system per- 
formance. Security becomes weaker since, for instance, a 
departed user could still access data until the next rekeying 
interval. However, the tradeoff may be acceptable to prac- 
tical applications, since we can adjust the rekeying inter- 
val according to application requirements. In the following 
section, we describe three interval-based distributed algo- 
rithms. 
3. Interval-Based Distributed Algorithms 
3.1. Description of Algorithms 
In this subsection, we present three interval-based dis- 
tributed rekeying algorithms. They are the Rebuild algo- 
rithm, the Batch algoritlzm and the Queue-batch algorithm. 
The use of interval-based rekeying aims to maintain good 
rekeying performance, independent of the dynamics of joins 
and leaves. The three distributed algorithms are developed 
based on the following assumptions: 
The key tree of TGDH is used as a foundation of all 
the algorithms. 
The rekeying operations are carried out at the begin- 
ning of every rekey interval. There exists a virtual 
queue holding all join and leave requests till the be- 
ginning of the next rekey interval. 
When a new member sends a join request, it should 
also include its individual blinded key. 
For simplicity, all clients know the existing key tree 
structure and they also know all the blinded keys 
within the tree structure. 
The group members would elect sponsors to be respon- 
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obtain the blinded keys of the renewed nodes (a node 
is said to be renewed if it is a non-leaf node and its as- 
sociated keys are updated), the key paths of the spon- 
sors should contain those renewed nodes. Since the 
interval-based rekey ing operations involve nodes lying 
on more than one key paths, more than one sponsors 
may be elected. Also, a renewed node may be rekeyed 
by more than one sponsor. In this case, we assume 
that the sponsors can coordinate with one another such 
that the blinded keys of all the renewed nodes are only 
broadcast once. 
We adopt the following notations for the three distributed 
algorithms. Let T denote the existing key tree. Assume 
that L 2 0 existing members M' = (Ad:, . . . , ML) wish to 
leave, and J 2 0 new members ~j = ( M ; ,  . . . , M:) wish 
to join the communication group within a rekey interval. 
3.1.1. Rebuild Algorithm 
The motivation for the rebuild algorithm is to minimize 
the final tree height so that the rekeying operations for each 
group member can be reduced. At the beginning of every 
rekey interval: we reconstruct the whole key tree with all 
existing members who remain in the group, together with 
the newly joining members. The resulting tree would be a 
cornplete tree. The pseudo-code of the Rebuild algorithm to 
be performed by every member is shown below: 
Rebuild ( T .  M ~ ,  J ,  M', L )  
1. obtain all members from T and store them in M ' ;  
2. remove the L leaving members in M' from M ' ;  
3. add the J new members in MJ to M ' ;  
4. create a new binary tree T' based on members in M' and set 
T = T ' ;  
5. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys in T ;  
Figure 4 illustrates the scenario that members Ad2, M5 
and M7 wish to leave the communication group and a new 
member Ma wishes to join the group. The resulting key tree 
has five members and all the nodes need to be renewed. The 
sponsors will include all the five members. 
M,,M,,M, leave 
M l ~ ~ l  M 3 1 ~ j  
M, M, 
Figure 4. Example of the Rebuild algorithm 
3.1.2. Batch Algorithm 
The Batch algorithm is based on the centralized ap- 
proach in [6],  except that we are now applying it to a dis- 
tributed system without a centralized key server and all 
clients contribute to the composition of the group key. The 
pseudo code of the Batch algorithm is given as: 
Batch ( T ,  M 3 .  J ,  M', L) 
I .  i f ( L = = O ) { / *  pure join case * /  
2. create a new tree T' based on new members in M j ;  
3. either (a) add T' to the shallowest node of T (which need 
not be the leaf node) such that the merge would not in- 
crease the height of the result tree, or (b) add T' to the root 
node of T if the merge to any node of T would increase 
the tree height: 
4. )e l se  { / *  L > 0 * /  
5. sort M' in an ascending order of the associated node 
IDS of the members and store the results in M'." = 
(Mi" ,  . . . , M i S ) ;  
6. i f ( L  2 J )  { 
7. / *  more members want to leave than 
join * /  
8. if ( J  > 0) 
9. replace the departed nodes of (Mi2', . . - , M$') with 
J loined nodes; 
lo.  i f ( L -  J > O ) {  
1 I .  remove remaining L - J leaving leaf nodes to the 
parent node: 
12. promote the siblings of the leaving leaf nodes; 
13 1 
14 ) else { 
15. / *  more newly joining members than 
leaving members * /  
16. divide MJ into L subgroups G = ( G I ,  . . . , G L )  such 
that the fi rst J m o d  L subgroups (G, . - . , G J  mod L )  
contain + 1 new members and the rest contain 
new members; 
17. create L subtrees (T;, . . . ,TL)  for the subgroups G ;  
18. replace the departed nodes of (Mi3', . . . , M:, .) 
with the roots of ( T l , .  . . ,T; ,,, .) and the remaining 
departed nodes with the roots of remaining subtrees; 
19. ) 
21. elect the members to be sponsors if (1) they are new mem- 
bers, or (2) the rightmost members of the subtrees rooted at 
the siblings of the departed nodes or replaced nodes in T ;  
22. if (sponsor) 
23. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys; 
Notice that the sponsors may have to wait for the blinded 
keys on another key path in order to proceed upwards to 
rekey the nodes. Finally, all the members obtain the neces- 
sary blinded keys to compute the new group key KO. 
The Batch algorithm is illustrated with two examples. In 
Figure 5 ,  we illustrate the case L > J > 0 of the Batch 
algorithm. Suppose M2, M5 and M7 leave and a new mem- 
ber Ma wishes to join. The following steps will be carried 
out: (i) Ma broadcasts its join request, including its indi- 
vidual blinded key. (ii) The leaf node 6 associated with M7 
is replaced by the node of Ma, and the leaf nodes 8 and 
24 are removed. Nodes 7 and 23 are promoted to nodes 3 
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and I I ,  respectively. (iii) M1, M 4 ,  M6 and M8 are selected 
to be the sponsors. M1 rekeys secret keys K 1  and KO and 
Mq rekeys K 5 ,  K 2  and KO.  Adl then broadcasts BIC1 and 
M4 broadcasts B I G  and B K 2 .  M6 and though hav- 
ing the sponsor role, do not need to broadcast any blinded 
keys as M4 has already broadcast this information. (iv) Fi- 
nally, every member can compute the group key based on 
the received blinded keys. 
Figure 5. Example 1 of the Batch algorithm 
whereL> J > O  
Figure 6 illustrates the case J > L > 0 of the Batch 
algorithm. Suppose Ma, Ad9 and M I o  join, and M2 and 
M7 leave. The rekeying process is: (i) Ada, M g ,  and Adlo 
broadcast their join requests together with their own indi- 
vidual blinded key. (ii) Ad8 and Mg form the subtree Ti 
and Mlo is the only member of the subtree Ti. The root of 
Ti replaces node 6 and the root of Ti replaces node 8. (iii) 
The sponsors will be M I ,  Ad6, Adg and Adlo. (iv) M8 
and Ad9 first need to compute the secret key Kg, and either 
one of them can compute and broadcast the new blinded key 
B K 6 .  (v) M I  (or Mlo)  rekeys I(3 and K 1  and broadcasts 
B I G  and B K l .  n/ls rekeys 1C2 and broadcasts B K 2 .  (vi) 
Finally, all the members can compute the group key KO.  
Figure 6. Example 2 of the Batch algorithm 
where J > L > 0 
3.1.3. Queue-batch Algorithm 
The previous approaches perform rekeying at the begin- 
n ing  of every rekey interval, which can result in a high pro- 
cessing load during the update instance and thereby delay 
the start of the secure group communication. The process- 
ing load includes the computation cost of the exponentiation 
operations in generating the keys, as well as the communi- 
cation cost of broadcasting all the blinded keys to all mem- 
bers in the communication group. We propose a more ef- 
fective algorithm which we call the Queue-batcl7 algorithm. 
The intuition of this algorithm is to reduce the rekeying load 
by pre-processing the joining members in the virtual queue 
during the idle rekey interval. 
The Queue-batch algorithm is divided into two phases, 
namely the Queue-subtree fonnation phase and the Queue- 
merge phase. The first phase occurs whenever a new mem- 
ber joins the communication group during the rekey inter- 
val. In this case, we append this new member in a tempo- 
rary key tree T'. The second phase occurs at the beginning 
of every rekey interval and we merge the temporary tree T' 
(which contains all newly joining members) to the existing 
key tree T .  Specifically: 
Queue-subtree (T') 
1. if (a  new member joins) { 
2. if (T' == NULL) / * no new members i n  T '  * / 
3. create a new tree T' with the only one new member; 
4. else { / *  there  a re  new members i n  T '  * /  
5. fi nd the insertion node; 
6. add the new member to T ' ;  
7. elect the rightmost member under the subtree rooted 
at the sibling of the joining node to be the sponsor; 
8. if (sponsor) 
9. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded 
keys to the communication group; 
lo.  } 
11 .  } 
Queue-merge ( T ,  T ' ,  M', L) 
I .  i f ( L = = O ) ( / *  there  a re  no leave * /  
2. add T' to either (a) the shallowest node (which need not 
be the leaf node) of T such that the merge would not 
increase the resulting tree height, or (b) the root node 
of T if the merge to any locations would increase the 
resulting tree height; 
3. } else / *  there a r e  leaves * /  
4. add T' to the highest leave position of the key tree T ;  
5.  elect members to be sponsors if they are (a) the rightmost 
member of the subtree rooted at the sibling nodes of the de- 
parted leaf nodes in T ,  or (b) the rightmost member of T ' ;  
6. if (sponsor) 
7. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded 
keys to the communication group; 
The Queue-batch algorithm is illustrated in Figure 7!  
where members Ma, Mg and Mlo wish to join the com- 
munication group, while M2 and M7 wish to leave. Then 
the rekeying process is as follows: (i) At the Queue-subtree 
fonnation phase, the three new members &I8, M g ,  and Mlo 
would first form a tree T' .  Mlo, in this case, will be elected 
as the sponsor. (ii) At the Queue-merge phase, the tree T' 
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Figure 7. Queue-batch: the Queue-merge phase 
will be added at the highest departed position, which is at 
node 6. Also, the blinded key of the root node of T', which 
is B K s ,  is broadcast by M l o .  (iii) The sponsors, M i ,  Ad6, 
and Mlo,  are elected. (iv) M l  rekeys the secret key IC1 and 
broadcasts the blinded key BK1: M6 rekeys the secret key 
K2 and broadcasts the blinded key B K 2 .  (v) Finally, all 
members can compute the group key. 
3.2. Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we present the mathematical analysis of 
the three proposed algorithms. We consider two perfor- 
mance measures, namely: 
I .  A~~erage iluinber of r e t ~ w e d  nodes: a node is said to be 
reriewed if it is a non-leaf node and its associated keys 
are renewed. This metric provides a measure of the 
communicatioii cost since new blinded keys of the re- 
newed nodes have to be broadcast to the whole group. 
2. Average rzurnber of e~~orzetitiation operations: this 
metric provides a nieasure of the coinputation load for 
all members in the communication group. 
For simplicity, we assume the following in the analysis: 
The existing key tree T is a completely balanced tree 
before the interval-based rekeying event. 
Each member has a homogeneous leave probability. 
The number of blinded key computations simply 
equals that of renewed nodes, provided that the blinded 
key of each renewed node is broadcast only once. 
For the mathematical analysis, let N be the number of 
members originally in the system, L (where L 5 N )  be 
the number of members which wish to leave the system, 
and J > 0 be the number of new members which wish to 
join the communication group. Let T denote the existing 
tree which contains N members. The level of a node v is 
1 = Llog2(v+ I)] ,  where v is the node ID, and the maximum 
level of T is h. Based on the first assumption, we know that 
N = 2h. Also, let Ralg be the number of renewed nodes 
and &,lg be the number of exponentiations for the particular 
algorithm alg. The performance measure Ea19 is composed 
of two parts: &ilg and &,big, which represent the number 
of exponentiations of calculating the secret keys (which is 
done by all members) and the number of exponentiations 
of calculating the blinded keys (which is done by sponsors 
only). We have 
Based on the last assumption. we know the number of 
blinded key computations is 
In the following analyses, we only consider the number 
of secret key computations &,Sig . 
3.2.1. Analysis of the Rebuild Algorithm 
Given N ,  L and J, we can obtain the exact expressions 
for the two performance measures RReblLild an
even if the existing key tree T is not completely balanced 
originally. 
The resulting number of members is N* = AT- L + J > 
0. Thus, the number of renewed nodes (i.e. the number of 
non-leaf nodes) is 
For EReblLiid(Nf). we find that when N* 5 1,  
ERebuild(Nf) = 0. If Nf E (2h'-1, 2h'] for hr  > 1 where 
h' = Llog2(Nf - 1) J + 1,  we have 
&AebTLild(Nf) = (number of members at level h') x h' 
+ (number of members at level h' - 1) x (h' - 1) 
- 2 (N* -2L'0gz(N*-1)J)(~log2(~* - 1)J + 1)  
+ ( N *  - ~ ( N * - ~ L ' o ~ z ( ~ ' - ~ ) J ) )  Llog2(N* - 1)J  
= NfLlog2(N* - 1)J  +2~*-2(L'ogz(N*-l)J+l). (6) 
3.2.2. Analysis of the Batch Algorithm 
In analyzing the performance of the Batch algorithm, we 
consider the following five cases. Note that when L > 0, the 
performance metrics will depend on the membership leave 
positions and exact metrics cannot be obtained. Therefore, 
whenever L > 0, we derive the expected performance mea- 
sures. We also define RaLg,, and &,lg,, be the two perfor- 
mance measures under condition c. We also adopt the con- 
vention that the combination (:) equals 0 if n < 0, r < 0 
or n < r .  Due to limited space, readers can refer to [5]  for 
detailed mathematical derivation and results. 
3.2.3. Analysis of Queue-batch Algorithm 
The main idea of the Queue-batch algorithm exploits the 
idle rekey interval to pre-process certain rekeying opera- 
tions. When we compare its performance with the Rebuild 
or Batch algorithms, we only need to consider the rekey op- 
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When J = 0, Queue-batch is equivalent to Batch in 
the pure leave scenario. For J > 0: the number of re- 
newed nodes in Queue-batch during the Queue-merge phase 
is equivalent to that of Batch when J = 1. Thus, the ex- 
pected number of renewed nodes is 
- L ,  if J = 0 and L > 0 
if J > 0 and L > 0. 
Also, the expected number of exponentiations when J > 
0 for Queue-batch is given by 
E[E~atch ,L> J=o], i f J = O a n d L > O  
EIEBatch.J=l and L>O] - + dJ: 
if J > Oand L > 0. 
(8) 
For J > 0 and L > 0, assume the new subtree is at- 
tached to a node at some level d. We first decrement d from 
E[EBatch, J=l and L>o] to exclude the secret key computa- 
tions of the leaf node which is now replaced by the root 
node of the new subtree. We then add d J  to account for the 
secret key computations done by these new J members. 
The value d is the level of the highest node that has all 
its descendents departed. Instead of computing the expected 
value of d, we can find the upper bound value of d, which 
occurs when the leaving leaf nodes are evenly distributed in 
the key tree. Thus, d is given by 
4. Experiments 
In the previous section, we quantify the performance 
measures by assuming that the existing tree is completely 
balanced. In this section, we perform a more elaborate per- 
formance study by investigating the costs of exponentia- 
tions and renewed nodes of the three proposed algorithms 
under different experimental settings. The experiments as- 
sume a finite population of 1024 users. Out of these 1024 
users, there are 512 members originally in the communica- 
tion group at the beginning of each experiment. We assume 
that potential members outside the group have a tendency 
to join the group with the same join probability. Similarly, 
members within the group have a fixed leave probability 
of leaving the group. We let p~ and p~ denote the join and 
leave probabilities, respectively. The performance measures 
include the average number of renewed nodes E[Rnr,]  and 
the average number of exponentiations EIEalS] as defined 
in Section 3.2. 
Experiment 1: (Evaluation based on mathematical 
models). This experiment evaluates the metrics of the three 
interval-based algorithms based on the mathematical mod- 
els presented in Section 3.2. We start with a well-balanced 
key tree involving 5 12 members and then obtain the metrics 
under different values of joins and leaves (i.e. J and L). 
Figure 8 and 9 illustrate the average number of exponen- 
tiations and average number of renewed nodes under difier- 
ent numbers of joining and leaving members. From these 
figures? we observe that the Queue-batch algorithm outper- 
forms the other two interval-based algorithm in all cases and 
there is a significant computatiodcommunicationreduction 
when the peer group is very dynamic (i.e., high number of 
members who wish to join or leave the group). 
Experiment 2: (Average analysis of a finite popula- 
tion with varying join probabilities). The previous exper- 
iment studies the case where the original tree is a balanced 
key tree. In this experiment, we further examine the case 
when the key tree becomes unbalanced after many intervals 
of join and leave events. We vary the join probability p~ to 
be 0.25,0.5: and 0.75 and evaluate the average performance 
measures of the three algorithms under various leave prob- 
abilities. The results are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. 
From these figures? we observe that Queue-batch outper- 
forms the other two algorithms in terms of the costs of expo- 
nentiations and renewed nodes in most cases. The exception 
is that Queue-batch needs more exponentiations than Batch 
when the leave probability is low (smaller than 0.2). The 
reason is that attaching the subtree of new members to an 
existing tree with few leaves may make the key tree unbal- 
anced, leading to more computations in subsequent rekey 
intervals. 
Moreover, the performance of Rebuild is the worst when 
p~ is lowt but approaches that of Batch when p~ is high 
(e.g., they have similar average numbers of exponentiations 
and average numbers of renewed nodes when p~ is higher 
than 0.6 and 0.8, respectively). Nevertheless, Queue-batch 
outperforms the other two algorithms at difierentjoidleave 
probabilities. This shows that the pre-processing of the join 
requests in Queue-batch can significantly reduce the com- 
putation and communication loads at the rekey intervals. 
Experiment 3: (Instantaneous performance mea- 
sures of a finite population). This experiment compares 
the instantaneous performance measures of the Batch and 
Queue-batch algorithmsover 300 rekey intervals (we ignore 
the rebuild algorithm because it performs the worst among 
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the three algorithms). We consider the cases with different 
values of pJ and p~ to represent different mobility charac- 
teristics of the peer group. 
Figure 12 illustrates the instantaneous number of expo- 
nentiations at different values of p ~  and p ~ .  We note that 
when the communication group has a high leave probabil- 
ity, Queue-batch significantly outperforms Batch. Figure 13 
illustrates the instantaneous number of renewed nodes. It 
shows that Queue-batch has a much lower cost in renewing 
nodes, as compared to Batch. This implies that Queue-batch 
can reduce the communication cost significantly. 
5. Related Work 
Wong er al. [ I  I ] and Wallner er 01. 1 101 independently 
proposed the key tree approach to secure group communi- 
cations. They suggested to associate keys in a hierarchical 
tree and rekey at every join or leave event. Later, the au- 
thors in [6, 7, 121 introduced the concept of batch rekeying 
to enhance system efficiency since the rekeying workload 
is independent of membership dynamics. All the above ap- 
proaches rely on a centralized key server, which is respon- 
sible for generating and distributing new keys. 
The authors in [ I ,  9, 3, 41 extended the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol [2] to group key agreement schemes for secure 
communications in a peer-to-peer network. Burmester er 
al. [ I ]  proposed a computation-efficient protocol at the ex- 
pense of high communication overhead. Steiner et nl. [9] 
developed Cliques. in which every member introduces its 
key component into the result generated by its preceding 
member and passes the new result to its following mem- 
ber. Cliques is efficient in rekeying for leave or partition 
events, but imposes a high workload on the last member in 
the chain. Kim er a/. [3] proposed the Tree-Based Group 
Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) to arrange keys in a tree struc- 
ture. Every member only needs to hold the keys along 
its key path, implying that the rekeying workload is dis- 
tributed to all members. The authors also suggested a vari- 
ant of TGDH called STR which minimizes the communi- 
cation overhead by trading off the computational complex- 
ity [4]. All the above schemes are  contributor)^, meaning 
that key generation is performed by all members and hence 
avoids the single-point-of-failure problem in the centralized 
approach. While the scheme in [ I ]  is independent of mem- 
bership change, the rest of the schemes [9, 3 , 4 ]  suggest to 
perform rekeying at single join, leave, merge or partition 
events. Our paper enhances the scheme in [3] to support 
rekeying involving a batch of join and leave events. 
6. Conclusion 
We have considered several distributed collaborative key 
agreement protocols for dynamic peer groups. The key 
agreement setting is performed wherein there is no cenrrnl- 
ized key server to maintain or distribute the group key. We 
show that one can use the Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman 
protocol to achieve such distributive and collaborative key 
agreement. To reduce the rekey complexity, we propose to 
use an interval-based rekey approach so that we can group 
multiple joinlleave requests and process them at the same 
time. In particular, we show that the Queue-batch algorithm 
can significantly reduce both computational and communi- 
cation costs. This reduction enables a more efficient way to 
manage secure group communication. 
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